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Abstract 
This study estimated price and non-price supply response coefficients for nine individual 
crops, sub-sectoral aggregates and commodity exports using the two-stage least squares 
(TSLS) and seemingly unrelated regression method (SURM) as tools for evaluating the 
effects of sub-sectoral aggregates on Nigerian agriculture. The estimates confirm two 
results in the supply response literature: (1) short-run price elasticities of individual crops 
are smaller than the long-run elasticities and (2) commodity sub-sectoral aggregates do 
not respond significantly to prices as individual crops. The results also show that the 
responses of food crops are sensitive to Nigeria's agro-climate and the traditional cropping 
patterns of Nigerian farmers, who are mainly smallholders. Moreover, individual crops 
and sub-sectoral aggregates do not respond significantly to capital expenditure on 
agriculture (CEA), possibly because of action lags, weak choice of agricultural 
infrastructures and corruption. Non-tradeable crops are more sensitive to the SAP dummy 
for institutional change (D2) than to the price support and food import dummy (Dl). 
However, the SAP dummy is likely to indicate the effects of the reverse flow of labour 
from urban to rural areas following the down sizing that accompanied SAP. This is because 
food (cassava, millet and groundnut) and cotton (consumed mainly by domestic textile 
companies) are the only crops that have significant and positive response coefficients. 
Finally, commodity exports are positively sensitive to terms of trade. 
The results point strongly to two conclusions. First, the significant sensitivity of crops 
to price incentives is not sufficient to generate desired aggregate response. This result is 
consistent with the findings of the supply response literature and suggests that structural 
adjustment is more likely to affect the distribution of farm incomes than agricultural 
productivity and growth. Second, the sensitivity of commodity exports to terms of trade 
implies that external and, hence, exogenous factors play a critical role in the path of 
exports. Therefore, getting domestic prices of commodities right would not be sufficient 
to expand the foreign revenue from commodity exports. This is also consistent with the 
consensus in the 1970s about the international commodity price and the well-established 
neoclassical propositions about the short- and long-run paths of commodity prices and 
income under conditions of free enterprise. 
The results suggest that price incentives, shorter policy lags, more efficient 
infrastructural support to smallholder farm households, and less corruption in the design 
and implementation of agricultural policies would raise the production possibility frontier 
of farmers, who make up over 60% of employed Nigerians. Food should be at the core of 
a socially optimal Nigerian agricultural policy because it has the strongest potential for 
structural transformation of the economy and better price and policy responsiveness 
than tradeable crops. 
I. Introduction 
Agriculture remains the mainstay of the Nigerian economy despite its decline in the 
1970s. Greater proportions of the population depend on the agricultural sector for their 
livelihood and the rural economy is still basically agricultural. The role of the agricultural 
sector in the overall response of the Nigerian economy to reform and adjustment policies 
is important because, given its relatively large size, a large positive response to adjustment 
policies was expected as a means of improving the overall performance of the economy. 
Since the severe crisis of the 1980s, Nigeria has adopted a series of policies aimed, first, 
at preventing the collapse of the economy and subsequently targeted at short- to medium-
term adjustment to ensure sustainable growth of the economy. The structural adjustment 
programme (SAP) is the latest in this direction. The SAP was supposedly designed to 
induce structural and institutional changes necessary to reorganize the productive structure 
of the economy so that self-sustaining growth could be attained. The performance of the 
economy prior to SAP suggests that the responses of various sectors of the economy 
undershoot the targets. It is therefore important to monitor the response of agriculture to 
SAP. 
In ideal circumstances, the economic unit enjoys a high degree of freedom both in 
terms of the alternative courses of action from which it could choose, and in selecting 
and implementing the alternative it considers optimal or satisfactory. The choice of this 
optimal action or policy requires, ex ante, evaluation of all feasible alternatives, while ex 
ante evaluation is predicted on some model of the relevant variables (targets, constraint 
and aims at an optimal action, and instruments). The potential effectiveness of policy 
depends in part on the model. Ex post analysis is necessary because there is no ironclad 
guarantee that policies perceived as optimal would indeed turn out to be optimal or even 
satisfactory. Thus, ex post analysis is to policy what quality control mechanisms are to 
processing and assembling plants. 
Research problem 
A significant part of the literature on the policy response of agriculture has focused on 
the short- and long-run supply responses of individual crops to changes in output and 
input prices. A number of supply response functions have been estimated for individual 
crops in Nigeria (Oni, 1969a; 1969b; Olayide 1969,1972; Phillip and Abalu, 1987; Herdt, 
1970; French and Mathews, 1971). Most of these studies focus on price elasticities. The 
studies are important to agricultural response analysis because prices are the conduit 
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through which structural adjustment policies were expected to affect agricultural variables 
(output, supply, exports and income). For example, the emphasis on market forces, the 
elimination of marketing boards and the withdrawal of government from direct production 
all aim for an environment in which agricultural output is responsive to market conditions. 
An analysis of agricultural supply responses to changing prices is, therefore, a crucial 
element in assessing the effects of structural adjustment policies on agriculture. 
Non-price incentives are also key complements to the SAP in Nigeria. For example, 
the Directorate of Foods, Roads and Rural Infrastructures (DFRRI), whose activities are 
enabled by fiscal allocations, aims to provide roads and rural infrastructure to complement 
the price incentives in SAP. Therefore, a study of the response of agriculture to adjustment 
policies would estimate price and non-price elasticities. 
The evaluation of supply or output responsiveness of agriculture to adjustment policies 
faces a key methodological problem: which estimates are more appropriate? Binswanger 
(1989) argues that the responses of broad agricultural aggregates to the policy changes 
are more appropriate than individual crop response because adjustment policies may 
induce intra-crop trade-offs. However, empirical testing of aggregate supply 
responsiveness is usually problematic. Oyejide (1990) and Braverman (1989) proposed 
that "grouped data estimators of the supply elasticities are less efficient than those based 
on single-crop ungrouped data". Available empirical results of studies so far indicate 
that individual crops do respond strongly to price factors, often with higher price elasticity 
than aggregate agricultural output. 
Individual crop elasticities are needed for policy analysis, particularly if the assessment 
of policy effects extends beyond output and aggregate employment effects. When 
objectives associated with spatial equilibrium, income distribution and balance of 
payments are considered, the impact of policy on individual crops becomes necessary 
(Braverman, 1989). Given that policy reforms cause domestic relative prices to change, 
we could witness major resource re-allocation among the various crops and between 
tradeable and non-tradeable commodities and, in fact, between agriculture and non-
agriculture sectors. Also, given the debt and foreign exchange problems associated with 
the pre-SAP crisis of the Nigerian economy, reform policies have aimed at inducing 
non-oil exports to enhance foreign exchange earnings and assist in solving the balance 
of payments crisis. Sub-sectoral aggregate supply functions are necessary to assess the 
general impact of the multiple targets of adjustment policy. 
Although the single-equation time-series approach dominates the empirical literature, 
we would draw the appropriate caveat in interpreting our results. 
Objective 
This study has one main objective, which is to estimate price and non-price supply response 
coefficients for selected tradeable and non-tradeable crops. It is therefore a first step in 
the assessment of the response of agriculture to adjustment policies. 
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Organization of the report 
The report has five other sections. Section II reviews the evolution of the economy before 
SAP, while Section III highlights the core policies of SAP. Section IV sets out the 
methodology adopted in this study and Section V presents and analyses the empirical 
results. Section VI summarizes the major findings of the study and key conclusions. 
II The Nigerian economy before SAP 
Nigeria's growth experience shows a gradual and steady performance in the immediate 
post-independence period, with a healthy balance of payments position through exports 
of cash crops. Marketing boards were used to extract surpluses from the agricultural 
sector, which were used to provide basic infrastructure. The development of the economy 
since 1960 has witnessed a declining share of agriculture in the gross domestic product 
(GDP). At constant factor cost, agriculture, which accounted for about 66% of GDP in 
1958/59, was estimated at 50% in 1970/71. Part of this decline is traceable to the relatively 
higher growth rate of manufacturing and mining, which is consistent with the development 
pattern characteristics of developing countries. Agricultural export was the engine of 
growth prior to 1973, providing much of the revenue that the government used in 
developing a basic infrastructural system. Agricultural export also financed the import 
substitution industrialization programme. Increases in imports due to increasing income 
and the import requirements of the emerging industrial sector induced balance of payments 
problems in the late 1960s. 
The oil boom of the early 1970s relaxed the financial constraints to development. The 
GDP at 1977/78 factor cost grew at an average rate of only 5.0% per annum between 
1975 and 1980. One major characteristic of this growth was its very unstable nature. The 
growth rates ranged from -1.3% in 1975/76 to 9.5% in 1979/80. Generally, government 
services recorded the highest growth of 17.7% in constant terms during this period. 
Manufacturing grew at 13.3%, while agriculture recorded a growth rate of -2.3%. The 
performance of the economy suggests that there was more to underdevelopment than 
financial constraints. The third national development plan acknowledged that the 
agricultural and manufacturing sectors during the period 1970-1974 performed below 
expectations. This informed the massive expenditure by government in the following 
period in an attempt to remedy these and other perceived constraints to growth. 
The fourth national development plan observed: 
A situation in which distribution accounts for as much as 21.6 per cent of the GDP 
while manufacturing accounts for only 4.8 per cent portrays a structural imbalance 
in the economy set-up. 
This imbalance was also manifested in the external sector of the economy. During 
this period imports were overshooting their anticipated levels — in fact, by about 46.5% 
more than the planned targets. Food, capital equipment and raw materials were the fastest 
NIGERIA; RESPONSE OF AGRICULTURE TO ADJUSTMENT POLICIES 5 
growing categories of imports. Food importation increased by almost 400%, indicating 
the magnitude of the food crisis associated with the expansion of the economy during 
this period. Exports, on the other hand, fell short of target by about 20%. Crude oil was 
the dominant item on the export list, targeted to contribute up to 96% of total exports 
during this period. "By the eve of the Third plan in March 1975, the country's oil 
production was at a record level of 2.3 million barrel a day, while the price per barrel 
stood at $13.69, having risen from $3.56 in 1973. Oil production was projected to grow 
at a modest rate to reach 3.0 million barrels a day by the end of the plan period" (Fourth 
National Development Plan). The fourth plan observed that barely five months into the 
plan period, Western nations' demand for oil plummeted, with adverse consequences for 
price. Nigeria's production dropped drastically, by 35%, to 1.5 million barrels a day as 
prices also dropped to as low as $12.00 per barrel. The situation improved in 1976 and 
1977, but declined again in 1978. "These unexpected developments greatly distorted the 
expected flow of financial resources, making it necessary for the government to engage 
in massive borrowing from the Euro-dollar market and from multilateral institutions 
such as the World Bank" (Fourth National Development Plan). Despite the unexpected 
events in the export sector, imports continued to climb. Increased domestic spending 
sustained imports and put serious pressure on the balance of payments. 
One of the identified problems in Nigeria in the articulation of SAP is that of policy-
induced distortions. A key proposition is that policy responses to the oil boom increased 
the level of distortions within the economy. Some of the key propositions on policy 
distortions in the economy are: 
• Pre-SAP policies encouraged the growth of domestic demand far beyond the 
productive capacity of the economy, resulting in distortions in relative prices and 
serious internal imbalance. 
8 Rapid expansion of public sector investment created serious distortions in resource 
allocation. 
3 Investment was biased toward unproductive ventures and investment projects were 
unviable and poorly implemented, and the rate of their expansion easily over tasked 
the capacity of the public sector, which was dominant in this area. 
8 Rapid expansion of the public sector was also characterized by increasing deficit 
spending by both federal and state governments in very unproductive sectors of the 
economy. 
° Dependence on external financing generated unsustainable financing needs. 
0 Trade policies during this period encouraged massive importation of foreign inputs 
for industries with unnecessary protection for very inefficient firms. 
8 Import licensing systems enhanced and encouraged inefficiencies in the allocation 
of resources and an over-valued domestic currency. 
9 The general level of subsidy, which was maintained under a defective development 
strategy, undermined competition within the economy and led to inefficiencies, which 
in turn undermined growth. 
The collapse of the international oil market was the immediate cause of the economic 
crisis of the 1980s. Foreign exchange earnings dropped significantly, causing adverse 
balance of payments. Despite events in 1981 and the clear signs before then, the first 
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main policy action by government came in April 1982 with the promulgation of the 
Economic Stabilization Act. The set of policies was aimed at halting the rapid decline of 
1981. It contained very stringent exchange control measures and import restrictions to 
address the serious problem of external imbalance caused by the fall in foreign earnings. 
This was also backed with appropriate monetary and fiscal policies. 
Between 1982 and 1985, the government applied austerity measures. The main 
objective of policy during this period was to reduce aggregate demand in the economy in 
order to dampen the pressures on the balance of payments. At the same time, attempts 
were made to stimulate production in productive sectors of the economy, particularly the 
agricultural and manufacturing sectors, to reduce domestic price inflationary pressures. 
Monetary policy control instruments such as the ceiling on the rate of aggregate credit 
distribution, minimum ratio of credit to indigenous borrowers, reserve requirements, 
compulsory advance deposit for imports and new interest rates structure were used. For 
example, the permissible rates of credit expansion for big and small banks, which had 
been fixed at 30% and 40% since 1975-1979, were reduced to 25% and 35% respectively. 
The monetary authorities changed interest rates three times in 1982; they were raised in 
January and again in April but lowered in November. The minimum proportion of total 
loans and advances that each bank could give to indigenous borrowers was fixed at 80% 
in 1982. 
This period also witnessed tight fiscal policy. The austerity measures reduced 
government expenditures sharply. The public sector deficit was reduced from 11.6% of 
GDP in 1983 to 2.7% in 1985. This was caused largely by reduction in federal expenditure 
by 28% in 1984 and 36% in 1985. 
II. SAP policies 
The structural adjustment programme introduced in July 1986 intended to restructure 
the production and consumption pattern of the economy; remove price distortions; and 
enhance the role of the free market in resource allocation. The SAP literature also claims 
that it aimed to reduce dependence on the oil sector and on imports and lay the basis for 
sustainable non-inflationary growth through diversification of the productive base of the 
economy and reduction of unproductive public investments. 
Although the initial programme package was projected to last for two years, various 
policies came into being at different times, some after the two-year period. The monetary 
policy was summarized in the SAP document as follows: 
The programme envisages that monetary and credit policy will be consistent with 
the targets set for balance of payments; the increase in reserve; fiscal policies and for 
control of domestic inflation ... a common feature of the various scenarios is a 
deliberate pursuit of a tight monetary policy throughout the programme period. Overall 
net domestic credit to the economy is envisaged to increase by 5 per cent and 6 per 
cent in 1986 and 1987 respectively from their 1985 levels ... It is expected that the 
desired movements in interest rate will form part of the programme review discussions. 
A review exercise of the restructuring of the financial sector and providing a plan of 
action for improved financial intermediation, will be set in motion during the second 
half of 1986. The government proposes meanwhile to maintain the policy of real 
positive rates that was established in 1985. (Federal Government of Nigeria, 1986) 
The 1986 budget proposed to adjust public expenditures to reflect the revenue 
constraint and to limit budget deficit to 3% of GDP. The SAP document also proposed 
that "expenditure reallocation will accompany general expenditure reduction in order to 
ensure that the net benefits obtained from the limited funds are maximized". In addition, 
commercialization/privatization of government parastatals was also proposed. 
The remaining part of this section highlights the trade and exchange rate and sectoral 
policies in SAP that could alter the incentive environment. This is important since the 
incentive environment is the key mechanism through which adjustment policies were 
expected to affect agriculture. 
External trade and exchange rate policy 
Removal of bureaucratic controls on trade was a key institutional change of SAP. 
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According to the SAP document, the "medium-term policy objective is . . . to gradually 
eliminate the existing administrative controls on trade, in line with the progressive take-
off of the second-tier foreign exchange market". The central element in the incentive 
framework is the nexus of policies pertaining to the price and allocation of foreign 
exchange. The second-tier foreign exchange market (SFEM), which was expected to 
merge with the first-tier to achieve a single and market-determined exchange rate for the 
naira by the end of the adjustment period, became a major instrument of policy under 
SAP. 
The import licensing system together with exchange control on all current transactions 
was abolished as soon as exchange liberalization began in September 1986. The number 
of prohibited import items was drastically reduced. In 1987 the system of advance payment 
of import duties was modified and in 1988 a new tariff structure was introduced. This 
new structure provided for tariffs for a seven-year period to enable adequate planning by 
both producers and customers. In order to reduce dependence on the oil sector as the 
principal earner of foreign exchange, the present administration is deeply committed to 
promoting non-oil exports. The SAP document set a "floor target" of $1 billion from 
non-oil exports by the end of 1990. According to the document, 
The government believed that the correction of cost-prices distortions through a 
realistic exchange rate, combined with other positive export incentives and 
institutional reforms, should make it possible for Nigeria to earn at least $ 1 billion 
from non-oil exports by the end of 1990. (Federal Government of Nigeria, SAP 
Document 1986) 
Under SFEM, non-oil exporters were permitted to retain 100% of their foreign 
exchange earning in domiciliary accounts. Export prohibitions were abolished for most 
items. In 1987, a new export finance facility was introduced by the central bank. The 
refinancing and rediscounting facility was to assist private exporters by providing 
refinancing for the export of both agricultural and non-agricultural products. In 1987, 
also, a duty draw-back/suspension scheme was introduced to enable exporters to import 
raw materials and intermediate products for use in the manufacturing of export products 
free of import duties. 
Sectoral policies 
Apart from the monetary, fiscal and trade policies, sectoral policies are an important part 
of the SAP policy package. The SAP expected strong short-term agricultural supply 
response as a counter to inflationary pressures. A comprehensive policy package for 
agriculture is touted as the cornerstone of the programme. The major objectives of 
agricultural sector policies are: 
<• To increase domestic food production in order to improve nutritional standards and 
reduce (and eventually eliminate) external dependence on food supply. 
• To increase domestic supply of agricultural raw materials such as cotton, cocoa, oil 
palm, sorghum, rubber, millet, sugar cane and maize to the manufacturing sector, 
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thereby increasing local value added and reducing dependence on imported raw 
materials. 
• To increase production of exportable cash crops thereby diversifying the export base 
of the economy. 
• To raise rural employment and income. 
• To achieve regional optimal crop production mix, reflecting the comparative advantage 
of each agro-ecological zone. 
The industrial strategy under SAP aimed at: 
• Encouraging the acceleration, development and use of local raw materials and 
intermediate inputs rather than depend on imported ones. 
» Developing and using local technology. 
• Maximizing the growth in value added of manufacturing production. 
® Promoting export-oriented industries. 
• Generating employment through the encouragement of private sector small and 
medium-scale industries. 
• Resolving bottlenecks and constraints that hamper industrial development, including 
infrastructural, workforce and administrative deficiencies. 
• Liberalizing controls to facilitate greater indigenous and foreign investment. 
Pre and post SAP performance of agriculture 
The role of agriculture remains significant in the Nigerian economy despite the strategic 
importance of the oil sector. The need to restructure the agricultural sector in an effort to 
enhance its role in the transformation of the Nigerian economy had long been recognized 
in Nigeria. All of the four development plans after 1960 targeted agricultural productivity 
and rural welfare. A number of strategies have been articulated and implemented in a bid 
to improve on agricultural output, notably the River Basin Development Authority, 
integrated rural development programmes, national accelerated food production 
programme, Operation Feed the Nation, and green revolution and agricultural development 
programmes. These programmes have combined various price and non-price incentives 
in attempts to restructure the agricultural sector, increase efficiency and raise production. 
These programmes notwithstanding, the growth rate of agricultural production has 
remained below expectations, as Table 1 shows. 
A comparison of the growth rate of agricultural production with those of GDP and 
industrial production in the 1980s reveals to some extent the crisis of agricultural 
production in Nigeria. Table 1 shows that agricultural production in the first half of the 
1980s remained below the output level of 1972. Industrial production, on the other 
hand, showed a better performance. Although the industrial base remained small, the 
index of industrial production was higher than the base year. The performance of 
agriculture as shown in Table 1 - despite the numerous pre-S AP policies and programmes 
- did not support the high expectations of SAP on the responsiveness of agriculture to 
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policy. In addition, the pre-SAP performance of agriculture suggests that it may be 
unreasonable to anchor the success of SAP in the responsiveness of agriculture to it. 
Table 1: Domestic production (N million) 
Year GDP Growth % Industrial Growth % Agricultural Growth % 
production production 
index 1972=100 index 1972=100 
1981 78.1 7.0 185.5 -2.8 90.1 0.5 
1982 78.3 ' 0.0 197.2 6.3 92.1 2.2 
1983 73.8 -5.1 154.6 -21.6 83.9 -8.9 
1984 70.0 -5.1 147.0 -4.9 91.4 3.5 
1985 75.5 7.9 169.4 15.2 95.8 4.8 
1986 77.9 3.8 196.4 2.0 100.1 6.6 
1987 79.3 1.8 197.6 19.0 100.3 1.8 
1988 82.51 4.0 220.0 11.3 100.3 2.9 
Source: Ojo (1989). 
Table 2 shows the performance of five key cash crops. In the table, the 1985 outputs 
of cocoa, cotton and groundnuts were significantly less than their respective 1970 levels. 
Though the outputs of all three have risen in post 1985, they have remained below their 
respective 1970 levels. The pre and post 1985 outputs of palm kernel and palm oil are 
higher than the 1970 levels; however, neither output has doubled in almost 20 years. 
Table 2: Output of principal agricultural commodities ('000 tons) 
Year Cocoa Cotton Groundnut Palm kernel Palm oil 
1970 305 358 1581 315 488 
1975 216 313 449 295 300 
1980 153 77 674 279 650 
1985 160 114 621 360 615 
1986 100 100 640 350 650 
1987 105 80 696 353 680 
1988 230 194 686 545 700 
1989 256 185 815 600 700 
Source: The Nigerian Economist, vol. 4, no. 16, 1991. 
Table 3 shows performance of agricultural exports. The table shows that cocoa earnings 
peaked in 1980 in real terms. It also shows that much of the increase in nominal revenue 
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reflects devaluation not increase in foreign earnings. The export of groundnut after 1970 
is almost insignificant. Similarly, the earnings from exports of palm kernel and rubber 
are insignificant relative to oil and cocoa. 
Table 3: Export earnings from major agricultural exports (N million (excluding oils) 
Year Cocoa Groundnut Palm kernel Rubber 
A B A B A B A B 
1970 133.0 191.52 43.6 62.78 21.8 31.39 17.4 25.06 
1975 181.8 295.23 - - 13.5 21.92 15.2 24.68 
1980 311.1 568.88 - - 14.1 26.33 14.1 26.33 
1985 182.0 203 95 - - 6.2 6.95 3.8 4.56 
1986 370.0 291.04 0.1 0.08 7.5 5.89 29.1 22.89 
1987 1497.0 363.47 - - 60.5 14.69 - -
1988 1475.0 325.38 1.4 0.31 203.2 44. 83 1.4 0.31 
1989 1043.5 141.19 - - 508.3 68.77 1.6 0.22 
A = Nominal earnings 
B = Earnings deflated by the exchange rate 
Table 4 shows the prices of selected principal agricultural commodities. The key 
inferences from the table are: 
• prices of all commodities oscillate 
• pre 1986 nominal prices were more unstable and lower than post 1986 prices 
• real prices are more unstable than nominal prices 
• real prices have not grown as fast as nominal prices 
Table 4: Principal agricultural prices in N/tonne 
Year Cocoa Cotton Groundnut Palm Kernel 
A B A B A B A B 
1970 297 1248.42 1086 453.97 67 281.63 59.4 248.00 
1975 690 1530.27 308 683.08 230 510.09 150 332.67 
1980 1300 1300.00 400 400.00 420 420.00 180 180.00 
1985 500 636.13 850 360.47 360.47 742.15 400 169.63 
1986 3500 1406.75 1000 401.93 401.93 401.93 4001 160.77 
1987 11000 2735.23 4000 1458.79 1158.79 756.75 850 309.99 
1988 11000 2903.14 4500 1187.65 1187.65 593.82 1000 263.92 
1989 1043.5 1924.42 4500 787.26 787.26 393.63 1000 174.95 
A = Nominal prices 
B = Real prices 
IV. Theoretical and methodological issues 
It is important to review and specify the various conceptual, theoretical and methodological 
issues central to policy analysis in general, and a policy evaluation of SAP in particular. 
First, this study is primarily an ex post evaluation. Second, the ex post evaluation has 
two forms: theoretical and empirical. The theoretical part involves a theoretical evaluation 
of the process that generated SAP. This is very important because consistency in the 
process that generates SAP, with well-established economic principles governing policy 
choice, is necessary to the success of SAP. The first issue that concerns us therefore is 
whether SAP is an optimal choice. The second issue is the key mechanisms through 
which SAP policies would affect agriculture and how the effects can be measured. 
Is SAP an optimal choice? 
In the absence of a counterfactual analysis of SAP and all its possible alternatives, it 
would not be possible to rank the alternatives and then determine if SAP is the optimal 
policy. However, it is possible to determine if SAP itself was a product of an evaluation 
of the set of all feasible alternatives. The genesis of SAP indicates two key facts: 
• SAP is a policy conditionally of the World Bank. 
9 Both the government and the World Bank touted SAP as the "only alternative." 
The concept and practice of policy conditionality restricts the policy choice of an 
implementing economic entity to the conditional set of policies. This raises an important 
theoretical and practical problem: Is it possible for a policy to be optimal if the choice set 
consists only of policy bundles selected by an agent whose objectives are likely to conflict 
with those of the implementing agent? Economic literature has not directly analysed this 
problem. In neoclassical literature, in which free choice is a basic precondition for optimal 
choice and efficiency, restricted choice has similar effects as overbearing government 
control. Therefore, if an overbearing government policy is a constraint to competitive 
behaviour and efficiency, so is a set of conditional policies. Just as the government is 
best that governs least, an external controlling agent is best that controls least. 
The idea of "only" alternative is an antithesis of the notion of "best feasible" alternative. 
The latter is consistent with neoclassical thoughts and doctrines of optimal behaviour; 
the former is not. Therefore, based on neoclassical concepts, principles and thought, 
SAP is not an optimal policy. 
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Key transmission mechanisms of SAP and estimation 
problems 
SAP consists of economy wide (e.g., exchange rate policy) and sectoral (specific 
institutional changes, removal of supposed tax on agriculture, removal of protection of 
industry) policies. This implies multiple channels of impacts. A complete evaluation 
would, therefore, require an analysis of the responses of not only all the sectors within 
the economy but also of the aggregate economy. This is by no means an easy task. The 
focus of this study on agriculture restricts the mechanisms considered to those that affect 
agriculture. We recognize the limitations of detaching the sector from the rest of the 
economy for the purpose of analysing its response structure. This limitation is due, in the 
main, to the effect that a sectoral analysis is unable to include all indirect impact channels, 
all types of trade-offs and all the multiple effects of economy-wide policies. This is why 
this study is only a first step. 
The reference points of this exercise are the diverse theoretical and empirical literatures 
on the response of agriculture to policy in general and those that investigate the Nigerian 
agricultural response in particular. While the theoretical literature specifies theoretical 
propositions about the responsiveness of economic agents, particularly farmers, to price 
and non-price variables, the empirical literature tests the theoretical propositions. The 
theoretical literature can generally be classified into three arguments: 
8 That economic agents are responsive entirely to price variables. 
• That because of the structural rigidities that are dominant characteristics of less-
developed economies, price mechanisms are less capable of inducing significant 
response among economic agents. 
• That economic agents respond simultaneously to price and non-price variables. 
The World Bank (1981), Kuester et al. (1990), Mundlak et al. (1989) and Krueger et 
al. (1990) belong to the first group, whose propositions are classified as the neo-classical 
counter-revolutionary paradigm. The group is neo-classical because its propositions are 
neo-classical and it is counter-revolutionary because it represents a negation of the 
revolution of Keynes. Three core propositions of the paradigm are: 
9 The market is perfectly competitive, implying that agents are rational and fully 
informed while economic resources are perfectly mobile. 
• Prices are "the most efficient system of information and incentives". 
• Adjustment is made fairly smoothly through price signals, the mobilization of factors 
between alternative uses, and the ability of entrepreneurs to exert foresight and 
anticipate future needs in the search for maximum rates of return on capital (Killick, 
1990a). 
Though market failures and externalities justify government intervention, especially 
in less-developed countries, the World Bank justification of SAP is anchored on the 
grounds that state intervention has distortionary effects in three key areas: resources use, 
domestic absorption and use of scare foreign exchange. The economic crisis of Nigeria 
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in the 1980s, which is well documented in the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) Annual 
Reports 1981-1989, appears at face value to vindicate the WB's position that poor 
domestic policies are the causal factors. 
Killick (1990a/b), and Yagci et al. (1985), suggest the need for caution in ascribing 
the crisis of less-developed economies entirely to domestic policies. At least two sets of 
factors could be identified. The first, referred to as external factors, are linked to the 
asymmetrical relationship that exists between less developed and developed capitalist 
countries. These factors include dependence on a few primary exports and on capital 
goods imports, low income elasticities for primary products, competing synthetics, terms 
of trade deterioration, weak infrastructure of international trade, and so on. The second 
set consists of internal factors, which include policies, climatic vagaries, population 
growth, political instability, wars, etc. The rather restricted analytical base of SAP raises 
two analytical problems: 
8 Is getting policies right sufficient to counteract all external and other internal 
constraints? 
8 Is getting policies right synonymous with getting prices right? 
It is clear from SAP that the answer to both questions is yes. It is important to point 
out that if these propositions were invalid, the effects of SAP on the domestic economy 
would be significantly adverse. The empirical exercise that we perform in this study is 
therefore a partial test of the validity of the underlying premises of SAP. 
Some amount of consensus on the importance of both price and non-price factors is 
shared by an increasing number of economists. Killick (1990a), Oyejide (1990), 
Binswanger (1989), Diaskosavvas (1989) and Chibber (1988) emphasize the importance 
of price and non-price variables for the response of agriculture. The consensus is also 
reflected in studies that have investigated empirically the response of agriculture to prices 
as evidence supporting the relevance of price variables. In Nigeria, Phillips (1987), Oni* 
(1969), Owosekun (1976), and Barau and Isitor (1988) are among several studies that 
have provided econometric evidence that some Nigerian crops respond significantly to 
price incentives. Generally these studies investigate the supply response of either one or 
two crops. For evaluation of the structural adjustment programme, however, the range of 
crops has to be made wide enough to include both tradeables and non-tradeables. It must 
also investigate sub-sectoral aggregate and sectoral aggregate response and not just 
individual crop responses. 
Even more fundamental, the issue of policy evaluation occupies a broader frame than 
supply response analysis. This is because supply by definition connotes a one-to-one 
correspondence between prices and quantities. When it is the intention to investigate the 
impact of policy, it would be necessary to consider output response to price and non-
price variables. It must also be recognized that the objectives of policy are multiple. 
Beyond changing the structure of domestic output (increments along the production 
possibility frontier - PPF), policy also expects improvement in efficiency and innovation, 
i.e., movement towards the PPF. These changes, would have consequences for 
employment, income distribution, social balance and external balance. Thus, the elements 
that qualify for a set of evaluation indexes would normally include most, if not all, of the 
aforementioned variables. 
NIGERIA; RESPONSE OF AGRICULTURE TO ADJUSTMENT POLICIES 1 5 
The dominant evaluations, however, have tended to investigate supply response to 
price and are therefore inadequate to provide insight into, for example, the effect of 
policy on export revenue, employment, income distribution (national) and social balance. 
The sectoral pattern of income distribution may be inferred from the evaluation of the 
response of individual output to policy. Besides the limited indexes of policy impacts 
that output response could analyse, it has also generated methodological problems of 
how to analyse the aggregate response for agricultural output. Oyejide (1990) and 
Binswanger (1989) reviewed some of these methodological problems. Kuester et al. 
(1990), in their criticism of Bond (1983), also provided some other limitations of aggregate 
supply response. It seems that it has become generally agreed that grouped data estimators 
of the supply elasticities are less efficient than those based on single-crop ungrouped 
data (Oyejide, 1990). Methodological problems apart, a clear distinction is made in the 
empirical literature about elasticities in the short run and in the long run. Short-run impact 
multipliers are expected to be lower than those for the long run. Binswanger (1989) 
linked the difference to differential variability of input size between short and long runs. 
For example, input size is more variable in the long run than in the short run. As a result, 
intersectoral resource flows occur mainly in the long run. It is for this reason that 
Binswanger insists that even though tradeables may expand in the short run, non-tradeables 
(food) would be less responsive in the short run. As a result, the adjustment would be at 
the cost of food security. Besides this, cost may rise since the fiscal activity that SAP 
requires would reduce the state's infrastructural support for agriculture as a whole. As a 
result, the intra sectoral resource shift would be in favour of tradeables to the detriment 
of non-tradeables. 
The roles of expansionary monetary and fiscal policies have not been given adequate 
attention in the discussion of agricultural supply response. It is important to recognize 
that these policies have increasing impact on commodity prices and on the adjustment 
process through the expectation formation process of decision-making units. Supply 
response in agriculture cannot be fully understood outside of commodity price dynamics. 
Macroeconomic and financial factors play increasingly greater roles in this process, 
particularly under SAP. Many studies still rely on the exchange rate as the sole mechanism 
of transmission from monetary policy to agricultural commodity prices. The point remains, 
however, that monetary policy affects the real prices of agricultural commodities. As 
noted in a World Bank study (1990), four major effects of an expansionary monetary and 
fiscal policy can be derived: 
First, it will lead to current account balance of payments deficit since the increased 
demand generated for tradable will raise imports, and direct exports to the home 
market. Second, the excess demand for non-tradable will raise P , so that P /P will ' rr n t 
rise, inducing resource transfers into non-tradable. Thirdly, factor prices will change 
in response to these sectoral shifts: in the short-run, real wages will fall if the 
tradable sector is relatively labour intensive; in the long-run, they will fall if the 
tradable sector is relatively labour-intensive. Finally, increased government 
expenditures may affect the economic and social infrastructure, depending on the 
nature of the fiscal expansion. 
It is therefore important to be very mindful of the role of monetary and fiscal policies 
in the adjustment process. 
V. Empirical Model, Estimates and Analysis 
The Model 
The sectoral model consists of three major blocks. Blocks one and two model domestic 
production of commodities; block three models exports of cocoa (XA) and palm kernel 
(XPA).' Block one has five non-tradeable crops (cassava, maize, millet, rice, yams) and 
four tradeable crops (cocoa, cotton, groundnut, palm kernel). Two criteria influenced the 
selection of the commodities: importance, i.e., contribution to total output, and data 
availability. The second block has five aggregates: non-tradeable crops (NTC); tradeable 
crops (TC); total agricultural crops (TAC); GDP fisheries (YS); and GDP livestock (YL). 
In this study we measure the agricultural supply response to reform and adjustment 
policies via numerical estimates of the elasticities of sub-aggregate and individual crop 
output to price and non-price policy variables. Most agricultural supply response studies 
have been influenced by Nerlove's model. In actual estimations the original model has 
been modified in many diverse ways (see, for example, Askari and Cummings, 1974; 
Phillips, 1987; Herdt, 1970; Nowshirvani, 1971). Most studies of agricultural response 
include some form of price expectation and partial output (area) adjustments. In these 
studies a distinction is often made between actual and desired levels of production (area 
cultivated) and also between actual and expected prices (Phillips and Abalu, 1987; Oni, 
1969, Owosekun, 1976; Nowshirvani, 1971; Herdt, 1970; Barau and Isitor, 1988). It is 
assumed that the desired output Y* is a function of a set of variable Z. Y* = F(Z (), where 
Z ( includes expected price at time t (Pe). Other exogenous factors affecting supply t and 
changes in actual output will only be some fraction (g) of the difference between the 
desired and the previously achieved output. The formation of the price expectation is 
often taken to conform with the adaptive expectations hypothesis, 
Pe-Pel_! = bi (Pt l - Pet I ) 0 < bt< 1. 
We modify the basic model to account for monetary and fiscal policies. This 
modification is a direct application of Frankel (1986). We assume that the expected rate 
of price change P c e for agricultural commodities is equal to the short-term nominal interest 
rate i plus storage cost S c 
PC = i + Sc (1) 
We also assume a simple money demand equation: 
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m-p = Oy - Xi ( 2 ) 
where 
m is the nominal money supply, p is the overall price level, y is the total output, O is 
the elasticity of money with respect to output, and X is the interest rate (2) in log form. 
The overall price level is an average of manufacture prices, with weights a , and 
commodity prices, with weight (1-a). The long-run equilibrium version of the money 
demand equation is given as 
where 
r is the long-run real interest rate 
The difference between Equation 2 and Equation 4 gives us 
m-tn+(Pm-Pm*)+(l-h)(Pc-Pc) = 0(Y~r)+X(i-u-r)(l-a) 
i=l/X(m-m)-0/M Y-Y")+u+r+ a/X(Pm-Pin)+(r- a)/X(Pc-Pc*) 
Combined with Equation 1 we have: 
Pce = l/X(m-}n)-9/X(Y-r)+u+r+a/X(Pm-Prn)+(r-a)/X(Pc-Pc)+Sc (5) 
Equation 5 shows the relationships among the long-run expected price of agricultural 
commodities and deviation of money supply from its long-run level (m-m*), the deviation 
of output from its long-run equilibrium level, the expected long-run rate of money growth 
{u), long-run real rate of interest (r), deviation of agricultural commodity prices from 
their long-run equilibrium path (Pc-Pc*) and the deviation of manufactured goods prices 
from their long-run equilibrium path (Pm-Pm*). In this formulation money supply 
influences price expectation directly. Fiscal policy acts to eliminate (Y-Y*) the GNP gap. 
Government expenditure targeted at the GNP gap affects price expectations and thus 
supply response. Given structural rigidities in most developing countries, the GNP gap 
seems to persist. Government expenditure, particularly on infrastructure, has been found 
to be important for agricultural response to prices. To obtain a more comprehensive view 
of the real economic effects of adjustment, it is important to take into account the effects 
of adjustment on infrastructure (World Bank, 1990). Available evidence suggests that 
agricultural output is particularly sensitive to both economic and social infrastructure 
(World Bank, 1990; Binswanger, 1989; Lele, 1986). 
The basic specifications in the various blocks form a modified Nerlove type model 
with price expectation influenced by monetary and fiscal policies as derived above. 
P = aPm + (1-a) Pc (3) 
m-aPm -(l-a)Pc = O-X. - Oy - X(r+u) (4) 
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Block A: Individual crops 
The block was specified as a general equilibrium macro econometric model. It is made 
up of nine equations each for five non-tradeable crops (cassava, millet, maize, rice, yams) 
and four tradeable crops (cocoa, cotton, groundnut, palm kernel). Non-tradeable refers 
to crops that are not traditional exports and tradeable refers to traditional exports. We are 
adopting this definition for simplification. 
The general specification is in the Nerlovian spirit; that is, we assume partial 
adjustment. Each equation is specified generally as: 
Xi^f[Pit,Pr,W,ZfXi(t-l)l (6) 
i - 1,2,3,4,5, for non-tradeable 
j = 1,2,3,4 for tradeable 
Y r f [ P f , P f , W , Z k J Yft-l)] (7) 
where 
X. = output of non-tradeable crops 
Y. = output of tradeable crops 
W = weather (represented by a weather dummy that assumes the value of 
unity for the drought year D 3 1972, 1973, 1982 and 1983 and zero for 
other years) 
Z. = various policy variables, which are incorporated through price 
expectation Pf 
P * = relative price of crop in terms of crop i in terms of the price of maize 
P * = relative price of crop in terms of crop j in terms of the price of maize 
F = Other variables i e = exchange rate 
p;= P*(Zf F) (8) 
P-= P)(Z?e,FJ (9) 
The price of maize was selected as the deflator for agricultural prices because of the 
wide cultivation of the crop all over the country. Though numerous other deflators are 
possible and have been used in the literature, maize seems to be best suited for capturing 
inter-crop substitution, which is a key attribute of Nigerian agriculture. Appendix A shows 
a different set of estimations in which the consumer price index is used as the deflator; 
this index affects the results quite significantly in some cases. We also considered using 
input prices but for the difficulty in obtaining a consistent and reliable data on this series. 
The state of the farm input supply system in Nigeria does not make for easy collection of 
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data. Middlemen who gain more by smuggling farm inputs easily expropriate government 
subsidies and, in some cases, raise input prices above competitive prices. A direct 
incorporation of subsidies in response equations would generate imprecise and misleading 
results. 
Conceptually, changes in patterns of supply and demand operate through the price 
mechanism. Relative price changes reflect changes either on the supply side or on the 
demand side. An increase in demand will be reflected in an increase in price, necessitating 
changes in supply and vice-versa. An identification problem may exist particularly in the 
case of non-tradeable food crops if the observed prices are not exogenous. We would 
have tried to resolve this by using farm-gate prices in our estimation. Unfortunately, we 
couldn't obtain a consistent series of farm-gate prices for most of the crops in the study. 2 
Instead, we have assumed that farmers' decisions are based on observed market prices in 
the immediate past period. 
In the equations, besides the weather dummy (D }), a second dummy (D ; ) was used to 
represent government policies that targeted prices, i.e., imports, minimum-guaranteed 
prices. This assumed the value of unity for the pre-SAP years and zero for the SAP 
period. The sign of D ; is indeterminate a priori because foods imports and minimum 
price guarantees have conflicting effects on prices. A third dummy (D 2) was used to 
capture the impact of institutional changes that were ;parts of SAP. 
In Appendix B, instead of the weather dummy, we used data on rainfall in the area in 
which each crop is grown. The rainfall data, theoretically, form a better variable to capture 
the impact of weather. It is expected that the variable would have a significant impact on 
crops, particularly since in most official explanations for poor agricultural performance, 
the weather is cited most frequently. 
The crop sub-sectors were treated separately since they are more likely to be inter-related. 
The tradeable and non-tradeable crops were each aggregated thus: 
Block B: Sub-sectoral aggregates 
X =X(Fl,ZfW,XJ (10) 
where 
F = lP*ai; a. = 1 
Y = Y(P2\ Zf W, YJ (11) 
P2* = ZP?*> B. = 1 
X + Y = XY(P*, P2\ Z, W,(X+ Y)J (12) 
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Fisheries and livestock had similar specifications. We adopted the aggregation 
procedure of Mundlak et al. (1989). 
Block C: Commodity exports 
The modeling approach is based on the conceptualization of exports as the excess of 
domestic production over domestic absorption, i.e.: 
XY. = Y s - Y" (13) 3 1 1 ^ ' 
Y.° = domestic absorption 
Domestic absorption is simply specified as: 
YP = f(P*, Z.) (14) 
Equations 7 and 14 imply that: 
XY. =f(P:, Z, WXYJ (15) 
Alternatively, 
XY. =f(P}\ G.) (16) 
where 
G = absolute levels of domestic absorption 
Estimation technique and sources of data 
The study relied on data from three main data sources: the Central Bank of Nigeria, the 
Federal Office of Statistics (FOS), and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations (FAO). For instance, we collected the data on output volumes and prices 
directly from the Statistical Division of the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN). The data on 
other variables were collected from the publications of the CBN, the FOS and the FAO. 
Data posed a major problem to the study mainly because of differences in the data 
published by the three main sources. Appendix C shows estimation results for data from 
the Central Bank of Nigeria and the Food and Agriculture Organization. The results are 
obviously sensitive to data. For example, the FAO data fit a simple trend equation while 
the CBN data do not. This is hardly surprising, since the FAO data are mainly projections. 
The CBN data are based on survey data and, as a result, are more reliable. Two other 
reasons justify our reliance mainly on CBN data. 
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• CBN data are the most comprehensive; that is, most of the data variables are contained 
in its publications. The use of a single source for most of the variables minimizes 
consistency problems generated by source differences. Besides, the CBN reconciles 
its data with the FOS set. 
o CBN data are the basic data set for policy articulation, sectoral and macroeconomic 
policy analysis, and choice. Therefore, if ex ante decision making is based on these 
data, it is consistent that ex post evaluations be based on them also. 
We divided block A into two sub-blocks based on regional cropping patterns in Nigeria. 
Each sub-block consists of maize and four other crops. Maize was included in both 
groups because it is cultivated in both regions, a fact that also justifies the choice of 
maize as the numeraire commodity. Each sub-group was estimated in block using the 
two-stage least squares method (TSLS) and seemingly unrelated regression method 
(SURM). The seemingly unrelated regression estimation technique, or the Zellner's 
method, was used for estimating this block because factors such as the cost of chemicals, 
fertilizers and farm implements, prices of manufactured products, the rate of exchange, 
etc., commonly affect the output and productivity of the crops. 3 
Blocks B and C were estimated using TSLS. The TSLS became necessary since it 
was found that a few of the prices were correlated to very few policy variables (see 
Appendix B). 
Estimation results 
Block A 
(1) YM = 6.41 + 0.13PM(t-1 )-0.10PC(t-1 )+0,0005CEA(t-2) 
(4.58) (1.04) (-1.29) (0.0007) 
+ 0,09TC(t-2)-0,13LA(t-2)+0.36YM(t-1)-0.50D1-0.03D3 
(0.38) (-2.67 (2.32) (-3.68) (-0.32) 
R2 0.78 N = 20 F = 23.89 
(2) MZ =0.42 + 0.86Pmz(t-1) - 0.24Pca(t-1) + 0.60Pml(t-1) 
(2.76) (1.93) (-1.82) (2.37) 
+0.22CEA(t-2) - 0.005TC(t-2) + 0.56D(1) - 0.13(D3) 
(1.74) (0.07) (-2.3) (-0.8) 
+0.23MZ(t-1) 
(1.06) 
R2 = 0.54 N = 20 F = 11.03 
(3) CS =9.57 + 0.90Pcs(t-1 )-0.43Pm(t-1 )-0.34CEA(t-1) 
(4.92) (2.65) (-2.25) (-1.73) 
-0.89LA + 1.71D2 - 0.74D3 - 0.166CS(t-1) 
(-5.96)(3.89) (-3.75) (-0.98) 
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Block C 
(16) XC(t) = 2.26 + 0.042PXC(t-1) + 0.25PX/Pm + 0.0006XC(t-1) 
(2.01) (2.42) (0.94) (0.58) 
R2 = 0.49 N = 20 
(17) XPK = 4.73 - 1.2PXPK(t-1) + 0.68PX/Pm + 0.13XPK(t-1) (2.62) (-4.08) (2.38) (0.76) 
R2 = 0.64 N = 20 
List of variables 
YM = estimated output of yams in '000 tonnes 
MZ = estimated output of maize in '000 tonnes 
CS = estimated output of cassava in '000 tonnes 
COA = estimated output of cocoa in '000 tonnes 
PK = estimated output of palm kernel in '000 tonnes 
RC = estimated output of rice in '000 tonnes 
ML = estimated output of millet in '000 tonnes 
CT = estimated output of cottonseed in '000 tonnes 
GN = estimated output of groundnuts in '000 tonnes 
YFS = GDP fisheries 
YL = GDP livestock 
NTC = valued output of non-tradeable crops 
TC = valued output of tradeable crops 
TAC = valued output of all crops 
XC = cocoa export 
XPK = palm kernel export 
Pmz = relative price of maize 
Pm = relative price of yams 
Pes = relative price of cassava 
Pre = relative price of rice 
Pet = relative price of cottonseed 
Pea = relative price of cocoa 
Ppk = relative price of palm kernel 
Pml = relative price of millet 
Pgn = relative price of groundnut p* = relative price of non-tradeables 
P*2 = relative price of tradeables 
Pnt = price of non-tradeables 
PT = price of tradeables 
CEA = capital expenditure on agriculture 
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CESS = - capital expenditure on social services 
CET = = capital expenditure on transport and communication 
LA = loans to agriculture 
FP = price index (food) 
D1 - dummy representing government policies to support non-tradeable prices 
and output 
D2 = SAP dummy 
D3 = weather dummy 
PXC = export price cocoa 
PXPK : = export palm kernel 
PX = index export prices 
PM = index import prices 
DF = GDP deflator fisheries 
DL = GDP deflator livestock 
* The relative prices are obtained by dividing the price of each commodity by the price of maize. 
5 
PNTC = ^T P"'A' non-tradeable crops 
1=1 
A = PX/PX I I 
P r c ' t r / l 
7 = 1 
X. = tradeable j 
B. = PX/PX i J J 
Analysis 
Short- and long-run price responsiveness 
The coefficients of the estimates in block A are elasticities because we estimated log-
linear forms of output response. This makes it easy to directly obtain short-run own and 
cross elasticities, and also to compute long-run elasticities. All the estimations were good 
fit of the data used. The estimates explain between 54% (maize) and 99% (rice) of the 
variations in crop output over the period of the data (1970-1989). The F-statistics support 
the conclusion that the models were good approximations of the behaviour of crop 
response. 
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As was expected, the individual crops had different patterns of responses to price and 
policy instruments. Some crops were more responsive to prices than others. Some crops 
showed little relationship to the variables in the equations, suggesting that they may be 
influenced more by variables not included in their specification. In such a case, this 
study simply demonstrates that the policy instruments and transmission mechanisms of 
the present structural adjustment programme may be inadequate for addressing the supply 
response of such a crop. For example, in Equation 1 the price of yams is not significant 
at 5% level. In fact only three variables - the adjustment coefficient, the dummy 
representing government policies supporting non-tradeable prices and output (D ), and 
loans to agriculture (with the wrong sign) - were significant at that level. The result for 
maize given in Equation 2 is not much different, as the coefficient of D1 was found to be 
relatively high and significant. Cassava in Equation 3 had better results in terms of the 
number of significant variables. Own price effect of .90 is very high and significant at 
the 5% level. The cross-price elasticity with respect to yam is also relatively high and 
significant, while D2 and D3 are also significant. Loans to agriculture had the wrong 
sign, but were significant at less than 5% level. For cocoa, own price and the price of 
tradeable commodities were significant and both had the expected signs. In Equation 5, 
own price of palm kernel was significant with the correct sign, while loans to agriculture 
were significant but with a wrong sign. Loans to agriculture was significant, however, 
and with the correct sign in Equation 6 (rice). D2 is significant in the response of millet, 
cotton and groundnut, while D3 was a significant determinant of groundnut. Own price 
was not a significant determinant of cotton and groundnut, and though it was significant 
in the case of millet, it was so only at the 10% level. 
Table 5 shows the short-run and long-run price elasticity and adjustment coefficients 
for the crops in block A. As expected, the short-run elasticities are generally smaller than 
the long-run elasticities. This is true of seven out of nine crops; cotton and groundnut 
were the only exceptions. 
Cassava and maize have short-run elasticities closest to unity, while millet, cotton 
and groundnut have short-run elasticities of about 0.5 and yams, palm kernel, cocoa and 
rice have short-run elasticities of between 0.13 and 0.33. In general, non-tradeable crops 
were more responsive to short-run changes in prices than tradeables. These findings 
were, to some extent, expected. The characteristics of each crop are different, the climatic 
conditions and spatial distribution are also different. These factors influence responses 
of individual crops to various price and non-price incentives. It is not accidental that 
cotton, for example, has higher short-run responsiveness than palm kernel and cocoa. 
The lag structure for cotton is much smaller than for palm kernel or cocoa because cotton 
requires a relatively short time between planting and harvesting. 
The results indicate competition between yams and cassava, maize and cassava, maize 
and rice, millet and groundnut, and groundnut and cassava for agricultural resources 
(land, labour and capital). However, only the competition between maize and cassava 
appears to be significant. Cassava response to yam price of 0.43 and response to millet 
of 0.60, and groundnut response to millet of 0.78 and cotton of -0.18, generally reflect 
the mixed cropping by small landholders. The results also show that maize and millet, 
cassava and millet, and groundnut and millet were complements. These results are 
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consistent with Nigeria's agro-climatic cropping patterns. It seems, therefore, that the 
cross-prices effects are indicative of Nigeria's agro-climatic and traditional cropping 
patterns of Nigerian farmers, who are mainly small holders. 
Table 5: Short-run and long-run price elasticities and adjustment coefficients for individual 
crops 
Crop Elasticities Adjustment coefficient 
SR LR 
1. Yam 0.13 0.20 0.36' 
2. Maize 0.86* 1.12 0.23 
3. Cassava 0.90* 1.07 0.16 
4. Cocoa 0.30* 0.52 0.42' 
5. Palm kernel 0.23* 0.40 0.42' 
6. Rice 0.33 3.67 0.91' 
7. Millet 0.57* 0.61 0.06 
8. Cotton 0.53 0.50 -0.07 
9. Groundnut 0.49 0.37 -0.23 
Significant at 10% or less. 
Official explanations of poor performance of the sector often give weather conditions 
significant weights. The use of rainfall dummy in these estimations has not captured this 
phenomenon. The results in Appendix A also show that even when we use the average 
rainfall of states of the federation that dominate the production of the crops, the rainfall 
variable was not significant at the 5% level. This suggests that weather may not be as 
crucial as is often assumed. However, the insignificance of rainfall may simply be an 
indication of serious methodological problems. For example, relating average rainfall to 
output may be flawed given that rainfall level over a given period of time is critical to 
crops. Second, other weather conditions such as sunshine or wind may counter the positive 
effects of rainfall. Unless these methodological lapses are shown to have insignificant 
effects on the results, it would be premature to conclude that weather is not a significant 
factor. 
Equations 10 to 15 show estimates of the five sub-sectoral aggregate supply functions. 
The estimated coefficients are indicators of short-run elasticity because log linear 
functional forms were estimated. All the equations were good fit of the data. Table 6 
shows the short-run and long-run price elasticities as well as the adjustment coefficients. 
Three key inferences may be drawn from Table .6. First, the agricultural sub-sectors do 
not respond significantly to prices. This is because the coefficient of responsiveness to 
prices is only significant in one of the five cases reported. This result vis-a-vis the result 
for individual crops suggests that trade-offs among crops offset responsiveness to prices. 
This result is very important in the evaluation of adjustment policies because it indicates 
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that the significant sensitivity of crops to price incentives is not sufficient to generate 
desired aggregate response. Second, short-run elasticities for sub-sectoral commodity 
aggregates are higher than long-run elasticities. Therefore, the results in this study point 
to aggregation inconsistency: the behaviour of aggregates is contrary to that of individual 
crops. Third, the short-run elasticity coefficients for non-commodity sub-sectoral 
aggregates (livestock and fisheries) are smaller than the long-run ones. 
Tables 5 and 6 show that the short-run elasticity coefficients for crops are comparable 
to those of sub-sectoral commodity aggregates (except for all crops). This suggests that 
the marked difference between the individual crop response and sub-aggregate response 
does not hold here. The key caveat, of course, is that while the latter is not statistically 
significant, the former is. It is also the case that the long-run elasticity coefficients in 
Table 5 are higher than those in Table 6. This follows from point two above. 
Table 6: Short-run and long-run elasticities for agricultural sub-sectors and exports 
Elasticities Adjustment Coefficient 
SR LR 
1. All crops 1.2270.56** 0.53/0.24 -1.33 
2. Tradeable 0.62 0.42 -0.18 
3. Non-tradeable 0.62 0.34 -0.84 
4. Livestock 0.02 0.09 0.78 
5. Fisheries 0.40 0.47 0.15 
6. Cocoa exports 0.42* 0.42 0.0006 
7. Palm kernel export -1.2* -1.38 0.13 
* Significant at 10% or less 
** Output/acreage. 
The results for commodity exports show that the estimates were good fits of the data. 
Table 6 shows that cocoa and palm kernel exports responded significantly to prices. 
However, while the coefficient of 0.42 for cocoa has the right sign, that for palm kernel 
has the wrong sign. Agricultural exports collapsed in the 1970s. In fact, most agricultural 
exports were dropped from the export table and have since not reappeared. Table 3 shows 
the example of groundnut. The time lag necessary to rehabilitate crops with long gestation 
and the changing domestic demand profiles for local industrial raw materials are bound 
to affect the present effort at stimulating agricultural exports. The competition from local 
domestic demand would affect the impact of price incentives. The negative response 
coefficient for palm kernel is likely to be the product of higher competitiveness of domestic 
demand. If this is true, the appropriate price variable should be the ratio of export to 
home prices. 
It is possible that the long-term relocation of resources away from cash crops since 
their collapse may be reversed if farmers expect that the present exchange rate regime 
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will continue and that the present relative policy advantage for cash crops will be sustained. 
This could be enhanced for crops for which increasing industrial demand forces up prices. 
Expansionary monetary and fiscal policies could ordinarily lead to a balance of payments 
deficit as the increase in demand for tradeables would raise imports and direct exports 
with its home market. Prices of non-tradeables would rise, inducing resource movements 
into non-tradeables. Under this scenario, expansionary monetary and fiscal policies would 
work against price incentives. Similarly, an exchange rate devaluation may have 
unexpected effects if it raises domestic prices more than it raises export prices. For 
example, a higher relative price in favour of inputs would raise production costs and 
reduce returns. Therefore, a domestic price biased devaluation combined with fiscal and 
monetary expansion would contract agricultural exports. The key point here is that SAP 
may generate undesirable effects if its multiple policies send conflicting signals to farmers. 
The results also indicate that terms of trade could counter or boost export response to 
prices. In either case, a favourable term of trade boosts price sensitivity, while a negative 
one counters it. This suggests that price sensitivity is not enough to boost exports. Most 
importantly, external and, hence, exogenous factors play a critical role in the path of 
exports. This implies that there is more to agricultural exports than getting prices right. 
Put another way, getting the price right is not sufficient to expand primary exports. 
Non-price responsiveness 
Agricultural response to policy in Nigeria manifests itself through channels other than 
prices. In fact, government policies have been targeted directly at agricultural production 
and growth. Both monetary and fiscal policies have been designed to increase agricultural 
output. Both sets of policies affect agriculture in two ways. First, specific policies are 
expected to have direct impact on output. Thus increase in loans to the agricultural sector 
is expected to increase agricultural output directly, while government expenditures on 
the agricultural sector are also supposed to affect the sector directly. 
Second, these policies have indirect impact on the sectors. Numerous side effects of 
other sector specific policies have negative or positive impacts on agriculture. We have 
at the modeling stage integrated monetary and fiscal policies through the price expectation 
formation process. In the model we arrived at a situation in which changes in the monetary 
growth rate would influence the real prices of agricultural commodities thus the response 
of these commodities to monetary policies. Expectation of inflation due to expansionary 
monetary policies causes investors to shift out of money and into commodities. Expected 
future inflation has a positive effect on commodity prices in the present. However, an 
increase in real interest rates (an increase in nominal interest rate in excess of the expected 
inflation) resulting from expansionary monetary or fiscal policies would cause investors 
to shift out of commodities into bonds. 
The SAP induced continued depreciation of the naira, and the scarcity of foreign 
exchange in Nigeria, have made commodity trading a means of obtaining scarce foreign 
exchange by non-farming individuals and firms. Thus, observed increase in commodity 
exports is not entirely caused by favourable commodity prices. More importantly, to the 
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extent that non-farmers use commodity exports as a means of generating foreign exchange, 
the benefits hardly trickle down. The enhanced demand is hardly sustainable. 
Expansionary monetary and fiscal policies have increased liquidity within the economy, 
which has put serious pressure on the exchange rate, raising the differential between 
official and parallel market rates. The differential and the persistent depreciation of the 
naira place further pressure on prices of exportables due to the increased in demand. 
In our estimations, however, we have not used direct monetary and fiscal aggregates. 
For monetary policy we have used domestic credit to agriculture as a more relevant 
proxy for monetary policy, while capital expenditure on agriculture, social services, 
transport and communication were used as proxies for fiscal policies. Two dummies, D1 
and D2, were also used to capture the combined effects of policies. Since the estimations 
are in log form we can consider relevant policy elasticities. A quick look at the three 
blocks reveals that these policy elasticities did not perform particularly well. Yet we can 
gain some insight into the impact of policy response with some further refinement of the 
model. While all these results are indicative, it is nevertheless clear from the estimations 
that serious response problems exist in Nigeria's agricultural sector. 
Table 7 shows the short-run elasticity for the four policy variables. The key inferences 
from the table are: 
1. The response of crops and sub-sectoral aggregates to capital expenditure on agriculture 
(CEA) is significant in only 3 of 11 cases. Of the three, it has a positive sign for 
maize but negative for cassava and tradeables. It has a positive sign in four (yams, 
cotton, tradeable acreage and non-tradeable) and a negative sign in the other four 
(cocoa, rice, millet, total crop). The positive sign implies that CEA had positive 
impact on the variables while a negative sign implies negative effects. Clearly, 
therefore, the short-term impact of CEA on agriculture is not significantly positive. 
Action lags, weaknesses in choice of infrastructure, leakage and methodological 
problems may explain the result. For example, not all capital expenditure on 
agriculture becomes agricultural capital goods within a budget year. In the case of 
long action lags, regressing current output on current CEA is most likely to generate 
negative and insignificant coefficients. Without a breakdown in CEA, it is difficult 
to identify the appropriate lag structure. It is interesting to note that the variables 
with a positive sign are those on which land improvement (a key capital formation 
activity) has short-term impacts. 4 Thus, while the coefficient of tradeable output is 
negative, that for tradeable acreage is positive. Weak choice of agricultural 
infrastructures and leakages arising from corruption would have similar short-term 
effects as long action lags. 
2. The response of crops and sub-sectoral aggregates to capital expenditure on 
agricultural loans (LA) is significant in 6 of 11 cases. Of the six, it has a positive sign 
in three cases (rice, non-tradeable and tradeable acreage) and a negative sign in the 
other three (cassava, palm kernel and tradeable). It has a negative sign in four of the 
remaining five variables. The positive sign implies LA had positive impact on the 
variables while a negative sign implies negative effects. A most important observation 
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from the result is that all tradeable crops respond negatively to agricultural loans, 
which suggests diversion of agricultural loans to other purposes. This result is 
important because tradeable crop farmers have better access to credit than non-
tradeable farmers have, because the latter are less commercial and operate on smaller 
scales than the former. It seems, therefore, that the mechanism offering the most 
potential benefit is improving access of small-scale food producers to domestic credit. 
3. Non-tradeable crops appear to have responded more significantly and more positively 
to the SAP dummy for institutional change (D2) than to the price support and food 
import dummy (Dl). This is hardly surprising given that whereas the latter sends 
opposing signals, the former sends a clear one. Two inferences could be drawn from 
this result. First, policy compatibility promotes desired response and vice versa. 
Second, institutional problems are critical constraints to the behaviour of farmers. 
The results may also easily be indicative of the reverse flow of labour from urban to 
rural areas following the down sizing that accompanied SAP. This seems plausible 
considering that the four significant products are food (cassava, millet and groundnut) 
and cotton that is consumed mainly by domestic textile companies. 
Table 7: Short-run elasticity for policy variables 
Crop/sub aggregate CEA LA D1 D2 
Yam 0.0005 -0.13 -0.50* 
Maize 0.22* -0.56* 
Cassava -0.34* -0.89* 1.71* 
Cocoa -0.04 -0.02 0.077 
Palm kernel -0.076* -0.89 
Rice -0.54 0.64* 0.17 
Millet -0.0009 0.70* 
Cotton 0.44 -0.11 1.59* 
Groundnut -0.08 1.04* 
Total Crop -0.33 0.40 0.43 
Tradeable -0.16* -0.25* 0.08 
Non-tradeable 0.24 0.56* -0.42* 
Tradeable acreage 0.41 0.04* 
* Significant at 5%. 
Food production remains a problem in Nigeria's agricultural sector. While the collapse 
of Nigeria's agricultural commodity exports was compensated for by rising oil revenue, 
the collapse of the food sub-sector, which initially was compensated for by importation, 
has since the present crisis become quite problematic. The roots of the current food crisis 
can be traced to Nigeria's long-term agricultural policies. Studies have shown clearly 
that numerous factors including weather, research and basic rural infrastructure influence 
food production and farm profits. Early research on commodities focused primarily on 
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cash crops because these crops served colonial interests. Nigeria's first agricultural 
research station, the Moor Plantation, started in 1899 by the British Empire Cotton 
Growing Association, was for cash crop research. In Nigeria, large-scale plantations 
were not used to promote commodity trade. Rather, small-scale farmers were encouraged 
to produce cash crops - often at the expense of food crop production - and the practice 
flourished under the prevailing prices (Okigbo, 1982). 
Since then, until quite recently, the focus of agricultural research in Nigeria has been 
on cash crops. In the immediate post-independence period the foreign exchange realized 
from cash crops and the revenues they provided through the marketing boards made 
them great attractions to government. The need for a balance between food and cash 
crops was taken for granted until the collapse of cash exports in the 1970s. This problem 
was, however, addressed in the first long-range plan for agricultural development in 
Nigeria (FA), 1966. The document emphasized the importance of food production and 
nutrition in agricultural development and the need to strike a meaningful balance between 
cash and food crop production. Yet during the second national development plan (1970-
1974), 63% of total allocation for agricultural research went to export crops, compared 
with the 33% for food crops (Idachaba, 1980). In the 1970s, with the emergence of 
petroleum as the leading foreign exchange earner, government's interest in Nigeria's 
cash crops declined and its commitment to the sector's growth and development also 
declined. 
A close look at the performance of the agricultural sector could explain the response 
captured by the estimations above. Long-term growth in agriculture requires investment 
and capital accumulation in that sector and increasing utilization of the relatively abundant 
labour in the economy. Investment in the agricultural sector is also required to stem the 
continuous migration of rural workers into urban areas. It has been observed that only a 
very small proportion of public sector investment spending goes to agriculture. For 
example, although 13% of planned public sector investment in the 1962-1968 
development plan was targeted at agriculture, by the end of the period it had accounted 
for only 9.9%. During the second plan period the actual percentage was 9.7% as against 
the planned 6.6%. This relatively small share of agriculture in public sector investment 
has created a serious bias against the sector in the provision of basic social and economic 
infrastructure. The cumulative effect of this development is at the root of the present 
state of technological development and the harsh burden on agricultural production in 
Nigeria. 
Although the share of agriculture in total public sector investment is relatively low, 
the actual expenditure has been on the increase. In fact, a huge amount of resources has 
been pumped into the agricultural sector, on paper, in Nigeria within the last decades. 
The issue is the extent to which these expenditures actually go for what they are meant. 
The leakages in the sector, as with nearly all government expenditures, could be very 
high, accounting for the low response of the sector to increased expenditures. 
In the 1970s, Nigeria started what could be considered a determined effort to transform 
the agricultural sector. Efforts to rehabilitate oil palm and cocoa growing activities resulted 
in some improvements in the performance of these commodities. The Tiga Dam was 
built to irrigate 5,600 hectares of land and tractor-hiring units were established to facilitate 
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large-scale farming in various parts of the country. However, the large-scale programme 
for food production that the government had emphasized in many states produced 
disappointing results. The National Accelerated Food Production Programme (NAFPP) 
was "the boldest programme so far aimed at increasing food production by small farmers.... 
the first well planned and well conceived food crop production programme for small-
holders in Nigeria" Okigbo, 1982). The NAFPP concept was articulated and launched in 
1972 but the pilot projects began in 1974. The aim was to make Nigeria self-sufficient in 
six basic staple food crops - maize, rice, millet, sorghum, wheat and cassava - by using 
individual farmers to produce and multiply improved seeds for wider distribution to 
farmers for planting. 
The programme had great potential for increasing the yield of the six crops, as shown 
in Table 8. The third national plan indicated clearly that the programme would continue 
during that plan period in view of its potential. 
Table 8: Comparison of yields for NAFPP packages, practices and local practices 
Crop and state Local yield NFPP yield Potential 
(T/hectare) (T/hectare) yield increase 
Cassava (Imo) 9.29 15.0 +60% 
Maize (Oyo) 1.3 2.8 +115% 
Rice (Oyo) 1.1 2.2 +100% 
Sorghum (Kano) 0.65 1.5 +130% 
Millet (Kano) 0.65 1.5 +130% 
Wheat (Kano) 1.3 3.0 +130% 
Source: Federal Department of Agriculture: Consolidated Report 1971-1978; Okigbo (1982: 319). 
Unfortunately, in 1975 the NAFPP was de-emphasized to make room for the launching 
of another programme, Operation Feed the Nation. The reasons for this action, according 
to Okigbo (1982), were the slow progress made with the NAFPP, the continuing increase 
in food prices and imports, and a change in the Government of Nigeria. It should be 
noted that this was only one year after the pilot projects of the NAFPP had started, 
definitely not enough time to justify the allegation of "slow progress". Again, the NAFPP 
could not justifiable be blamed for the "continuing increase in food prices". How could 
food prices be expected to stabilize or even drop because a well-articulated food production 
programme had been tested at the "pilot project" level for one year? Obviously, the main 
reason for de-emphasizing the NAFPP was the change in government. 
Two other factors help to explain why agricultural development programmes in the 
past failed to stimulate the agricultural sector to produce the desired results. These have 
to do with policy articulation and policy/programme implementation. The Operation 
Feed the Nation programme provides a good example of both poor policy articulation 
and poor implementation. Like the NAFPP with which it was expected to complement, 
the OFN aimed at getting as many people as possible in Nigeria, including non-farmers, 
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to farm so that self-sufficiency in food crops with possible excess for export could be 
attained in the shortest possible time. Because of poor articulation, the OFN succeeded 
only as a slogan . Okigbo (1982) diagnosed the problem as follows: From its inception, 
the OFN was doomed to failure because it was begun without up-to-date statistics for 
planning, with neither a clear definition of responsiblities nor an effective organization. 
No consideration was given to the shortage of personnel, the logistics for input distribution, 
the potential problems or the resources needed to provide effective support to those who 
decided to participate in the campaign.. 
From such a confused start, implementation was definitely a lost battle. The programme 
did not contribute significantly to increased food production, to a drop in food prices, or 
to a reduction of mounting imports. It represented an example of government throwing 
money at a problem. Its main success was that it disrupted the NFPP, which had been 
started by the previous regime. 
Nigeria has also experienced numerous World Bank assisted integrated rural 
development projects. The integrated rural development strategy has not achieved its 
targets. The activities of the agencies involved in the rural development drive have 
remained largely uncoordinated and not properly focused. The Ministries of Agriculture 
and Rural Development, the River Basin Development Authorities, and the National 
Seed Service have all carried out their activities without proper acknowledgement and 
coordination of their collective efforts. The obvious waste arising from conflict of authority 
and administrative duplication has cost agricultural development quite heavily. Thus, we 
could identify the following factors as the key causes of the cumulative degeneration of 
the agricultural sector: 
® poor policy articulation 
• the desire of each political regime to put in place its own programme irrespective of 
the merits of the previous one 
® poorly conceived and uncoordinated rural development programmes 
It is clear that policy effectiveness in Nigeria has been hampered by policy 
inconsistencies and the lack of a will to follow through in a determined manner once a 
policy is put in place. The lag between the announcement of policy and the implementation 
of policy is sometimes very long. The signals that individual units get from such policies 
are thus confused, and the uncertainty dampens response to the policies. Units adopt a 
wait-and-see attitude to policy announcements to see if the policy will be implemented 
and if it will be sustained. Where policy targets are set, they are never adhered to. 
Table 9 shows that the actual growth of money supply exceeded target levels in 1987 
and 1988. For example, actual growth of money supply overshot target level by 5.3% 
and 28.9% in 1987 and 1988 respectively. Similarly, credit to the government sector was 
above target levels as was credit to the economy and to the private sector. Generally, 
monetary policy in Nigeria has been expansionary mainly because it accommodates 
fiscal policy. Government in Nigeria has not been willing or able to use monetary policy 
as a lead policy instrument and this is clearly reflected in the performance of the policy 
under SAR Therefore, fiscal accommodation is causal to overshooting of monetary policy 
targets. 
NIGERIA; RESPONSE OF AGRICULTURE TO ADJUSTMENT POLICIES 3 5 
Table 9: Monetary and credit development (Nmillion) 
1986 1987 1988 
Credit to domestic economy 36,820.3 41,390.8 52,210.6 
% growth 12.7 12.4 26.1 
% target 8.7 4.4 8.1 
Credit to private sector 17,305.0 19,125.8 23,247.4 
% growth 26.7 10.1 13.3 
% target 12.8 8.4 13.3 
Credit to government sector 19,455.3 22,265.0 28,954.2 
% growth 2.5 14.4 30.0 
% target 5.9 1.5 2.5 
Money supply (M1) 12,728.3 14,905.9 21,446.4 
% growth -4.1 17.1 43.9 
% target 11.8 15.0 
Source: Ojo (1989). 
The fiscal operations of the federal government during the period did not conform to 
targets. In 1986, for example, a budget deficit of N8,254.3 million was incurred by the 
federal government, which was 10.3% of GDP in comparison with the target of 3.5%. In 
1987, the deficit/GDP ratio declined to 4.2% but in 1988, it increased to 8.5%. The level 
of deficit persisted in both 1989 and 1990. Government expenditures continue to rise 
faster than realized revenue. The fiscal performance of government in 1986 showed a 
25.5% decline in government deficit, fromN3,580.2 million in 1985 to N2,666.8 million 
in 1986. Federal government finances improved considerably in 1987 due to higher crude 
oil prices and depreciation of the value of the naira. Retained revenue of the government 
increased by 102.4% from N16,129.0 million in 1987. Despite this, Government recorded 
a deficit of N5,889.7 million, which was nevertheless lower than the N8,254.3 million in 
1986. Government expenditures in 1987 increased by 32.8%. In 1988 an overall deficit 
of N12,160.9 million was recorded. The increase in deficit resulted from a shortfall of 
N540.4 million or 3.4% in federal government retained revenue. The overall budget 
deficit represented 8.5% of nominal GDP, compared with 10.3% in 1987. 
The picture that emerges is that government remains a big spender in Nigeria. 
Resources appropriated by Government under SAP have continued without much change. 
Debt servicing, transfer payments, social and community service, and spending on 
economic services dominate budget allocations. These are not particularly the productive 
sectors of the economy. Increased government appropriation of resources, apparently 
for less productive sectors of the economy, cannot enhance the overall efficiency of the 
economy. Under these conditions the general response of the various sectors of the 
economy to policy is highly undermined. 
VI. Conclusion 
The key findings of the study are: 
• Short-run price elasticities of individual crops are smaller than the long-ran elasticities. 
• Non-tradeables are more responsive to short-run changes in prices than tradeables. 
• Cross-price elasticities are indicative of Nigeria's agro-climate and the traditional 
cropping patterns of Nigerian farmers, who are mainly small holders. 
® Commodity sub-sectoral aggregates respond differently from individual crops. For 
example, agricultural sub-sectors do not respond significantly to prices. In addition, 
short-ran elasticities for sub-sectoral commodity aggregates are higher than long-
run elasticities. 
8 Short-run elasticity coefficients for non-commodity sub-sectoral aggregates (livestock 
and fisheries) are smaller than long-run ones. 
8 Commodity exports respond positively to terms of trade. 
8 The response of crops and sub-sectoral aggregates to capital expenditure on agriculture 
(CEA) is significant in only 3 of 11 cases. 
8 All tradeable crops respond negatively to agricultural loans, while most food crops 
respond positively. 
8 Non-tradeable crops appear to have responded more significantly and more positively 
to the SAP dummy for institutional change (D 2) than to the price support and food 
import dummy (D,). However, the SAP dummy is likely to be indicating the effects 
of the reverse flow of labour from urban to rural areas following the down sizing that 
accompanied SAP, considering that the four significant products are food (cassava, 
millet and groundnut) and cotton that is consumed mainly by domestic textile 
companies. 
8 The negative sign and insignificance of D l implies that SAP may generate undesirable 
effects if its multiple policies send conflicting signals to farmers. 
The price and non-price response coefficients estimated in this study from which the 
findings were deduced should be taken as indicative. This is because the scope of the 
study is restricted, a few of the estimation results point to methodological limitations, 
and, of course, data are weak. These weaknesses notwithstanding, the results point strongly 
to two conclusions. First, the significant sensitivity of crops to price incentives is not 
sufficient to generate desired aggregate response. This result is consistent with the findings 
of the supply response literature. Therefore, SAP is more likely to affect the distribution 
of farm incomes than it is agricultural productivity and growth. 
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Second, the sensitivity of commodity exports to terms of trade implies that external 
and, hence, exogenous factors play a critical role in the path of exports. Therefore, 
getting domestic prices of commodities right would not be sufficient to expand the foreign 
revenue from commodity exports. This is also consistent with the consensus in the 1970s 
about the international commodity price and the well-established neoclassical propositions 
about the short- and long-run paths of commodity prices and income under conditions of 
free enterprise. The significant sensitivity of crops to price incentives is not sufficient to 
generate desired aggregate response. This result is consistent with the findings of the 
supply response literature. 
It is obvious that an efficient system of basic infrastructure through an effective 
integrated rural development programme is necessary to expand agricultural productivity, 
output and incomes. The capital expenditure on agriculture could enhance the productivity 
base through increased agricultural research on food and non-food crops, extension 
services, and rural infrastructures. Clearly, even a 1% increase in yield out of the potential 
range of 60%-130% multiplied by the acreage cultivated by the over 60% of employed 
Nigerians engaged in small scale food production would translate into a significant 
expansion in output. It is clear that the potential productivity and output gains from 
investments in yield research on food production is very significant. 
Our analysis shows that price incentives, shorter policy lags, more efficient 
infrastructure support to small holders and less corruption in the implementation of 
agricultural policies would raise the production possibility frontier. The economies of 
scale of such an economic environment could induce the structural shifts of resources 
that propel economies from primary production to industrialization. The higher sensitivity 
of food crops to agricultural loans suggests that most agricultural credit should be allocated 
to small-scale farmers of food crops. The results show higher social returns than loans to 
farmers of tradeable crops. That the latter have more access than the former under free 
market conditions implies that government must devise effective means of generating 
the socially optimal allocation. 
The role of fiscal and monetary policy and external factors in export supply, the relative 
price and non-price sensitivity of tradeable and food crops are objective bases for solving 
the policy dilemma posed by trade-off between tradeable and non-tradeable crops. The 
findings of this study show that food is less sensitive to external factors but more responsive 
to domestic prices and policy than are tradeable crops. This suggests that the emphasis of 
SAP on tradeables would not raise aggregate agricultural productivity or output, or put 
the economy on the path of structural transformation. In addition, discrimination in 
favour of tradeable crops violates the requirement for optimal social use of resources if 
it is less responsive to prices and policy than food. We suggest that more research should 
be undertaken to test the robustness of our estimates. If our results are found to be robust, 
food should be the core of a socially optimal Nigerian agriculture policy, which should 
aim at creating the best enabling environment for food production and farmers' incomes. 
Notes 
1 Cocoa and palm kernel were chosen because together they account for most of the 
exports; in some years cocoa accounts for the entire agricultural export revenue. 
2 A close look at the evolution of prices within agriculture and between agriculture 
and the overall economy shows some stability in agricultural prices relative to the 
consumer price index (CPI) in the 1970s. The implicit deflators for agriculture and 
the CPI were quite close and so were inter-sectoral prices in agriculture. Since the 
1970s, the food components of the CPI representing the retail prices of food products, 
which reflect the price paid by the consumer, and the farm-gate price, representing 
the price received by the farmers, have diverged significantly. Thus developments in 
more recent years have made the use of farm-gate prices far more relevant in 
estimations like ours. 
3 Se Chow (1987) for further explanation. 
4 Land improvement requires a very short action lag. 
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Appendix A 
Estimation of block A with consumer price index as deflator (1973=100) 
(1) YM =5.39 - 0.0025PM(t-1 )+0.31 Pc(t-1 )+0.021 CEA(t-2) 
(3.16)(-0.96) (1.63) (0.43) 
- 2.7E - 0.6TC + 0.0002RF + 0.34YM(t-1) 
(-0.03) (0.91) (1.75) 
R2 0.84 N = 20 F = 6.36 
(2) MZ =6.40 + 0.86Pmz(t-1 )+0.73Pca(t-1 )-0.50Pml(t-1) 
(3.40) (0.70) (2.03) (-0.80) 
+ 0.06CEA-5.91 E TC(t-2)-0.37D3-0.0002RF-0.09Mz(t-1) 
(1.02) (0.39) (-2.27) (0.88) (-0.29) 
R2 = 0.72 N = 20 F = 3.027 
(3) CS = 3.80 + 1.35Pcs(t-1) + 0.07Pm(t-1) - 0.00002CEA(t-1) 
(1.92) (2.17) (-0.13) (0.41) 
-0.26D3 +0.32CS 
(-0.82) (1.07) 
R2 = 0.73 N = 20 F = 4.30 
(4) COA = 2.86 + 0.08Pca(t-1) - 0.04CEA(t-2) + 0.0002LA 
(1.30) (0.28) (-0.93) (1.04) 
- 0.0001TC - 0.0001 RF + 0.51COA(t-1) 
(0.85) (1.41) (0.63) 
R2 = 0.53 N = 20 F = 2.30 
(5) PK = 4.7 - 0.02Ppk(t-1) + 0.0002LA + 0.19D1 
(3.4)(1.51) (3.28) (1.21) 
- 8.94E-0.5RF + 0.13Pk(t-1) 
(2-1.81) (0.54) 
R2 = 0:86 N = 20 F = 15.92 
(6) RC =6.36 + 2.10Prc(t-1) - 0.76Pm(t-1) - 0.11CEA 
(2.25) (2.41) (-1.66) (-0.79) 
+ 0.0005LA - 0.1000RF - 0.23RC(t-1) 
(1.16) (-0.76) (-0.05) 
R2 = 0.71 N = 20 F = 4.80 

Appendix B: 
Summary: Impact of Policy on relative prices 
Relative price of Significant variables Non-significant variables 
1. Cocoa D, CEA,LA, D3, Pca(-1) 
2. Millet LA (negative) CEA, D,, D3, Pml(-t) 
3. Cottonseed CEA, Pcs(t-1) LA (negative) La, D2, D3 
4. Cassava D2 LA, CEA, D3 
5. Maize (absolute) La CEA, D2, D3, Mzp(t-1) 
6. Yams None La, CEA, D,, D3, Ym(t-1) 
7. Groundnut D, CEA, LA, D3 Pan(t-1) 
8. Palm kernel d2 CEA, DE, LA 
9. Rice D2 CEA, LA, D3, Pc(t-1) 
Impact of policy on relative prices 
(i) Pza =6.20 + 0.12CEA - 0.24LA - 1.8D1 - 0.14D3 + 0.2Pca(t-1) 
(4.17) (0.56) (-1.55) (-3.12) (-0.51 (0.09) 
R = 0.55 N =20 F =7.813 
(ii) Pml =5.86 + 0.18CEA - 0.23LA + 0.013D1 - 0.14D3+0.24Pca(t-1) 
(4.54) (1.16) (-2.06) (0.05) (0.69) (0.89) 
R = 0.36 N = 20 F = 1.37 
(iii) Pet = 7.57 + 0.37CEA - 0.76LA + 0.13D1 - 0.21 D3 + 0.24Pml (-1) (4.51) (2.34) (-4.97) (0.44) (-0.39) (-0.99) 
(iv) Pes =1.21 + 0.38CEA - 0.08LA + 0.26D2 - 0.21 D3 + 0.57Pcs(-1) 
(1.12) (3.02) (-0.44) (1.00) (-0.03) (2.25) 
R - 0.92 N = 20 F = 38.27 
(v) Pc =5.27 - 0.09CEA - 0.04LA - 0.70D2 + 0.16D3 + 0.07PC(t-1) (2.53) (-0.43) (-0.29) (1.75) (0.49) (0.23) 
R = 0.30 N =20 F = 1.03 
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(vi) Mzp =4.08 - 0.07CEA + 0.51LA + 0.07D2 - 0.12D3 - 0.05Mzp(t-1) 
(2.96) (-0.14) (2.56) (0.21) (0.44) (0.14) 
R = 0.85 N = 20 F = 24.40 
(vii) Pm =4.67 + 0.22CEA - 0.11 LA + 0.1 D1 + 0.08D3 - 0.15Ym(t-1) 
(3.7) (1.4) (-1.0) (0.34) (0.39) (-0.49) 
R = 0.16 N = 20 F = 0.45 
(viii) Pgn =6.35 + 0.21CEA - 0.15LA - 0.73D1 - 0.31D3 - 0.36Pgn(t-1) 
(4.5) (1.14) (-1.38) (-2.11) (-1.25) (-1.38) 
R = 0.41 N = 20 F = 1.67 
(ix) Ppx =3.44 + 0.16CEA + 0.17LA + 0.8D2 - 0.12D2 (10.8) (1.5) (1.8) (3.5) (-0.69) R = 0.89 N = 20 F = 30.42 
Appendix C 
Trend estimates of selected agricultural variables using FAO and CBN data 
Variable Data Constant Trent Adjusted R2 DW F statistics 
source term 
Total 
agriculture 
FAO -7449.52 
(-11.00)* 
3.81 
(11.16) 
0.92 1.95 125.58 
CBN -3404.14 
(-3.37) 
1.77 
(3.48) 
0.48 0.33 12.09 
Crop 
production 
FAO -6981.2 
(-8.08) 
3.57 
(8.21) 
0.86 1.86 67.36 
CBN -7006.06 
(-3.34) 
3.59 
(3.39) 
0.43 0.37 11.51 
Livestock 
production 
FAO -9.258.75 
(-14.83) 
4.73 
(15.01) 
0.95 0.94 225.18 
CBN -213.56 
(0.32) 
-0.06 
(-0.19) 
0.07 1.67 0.04 
Cereals 
production 
FAO -14561.21 
(-9.31) 
7.40 
(9.39) 
0.89 2.06 88.12 
CBN -8161.33 
(-2.82) 
4.18 
(2.87) 
0.34 0.26 8.24 
* T-statistics 
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